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COMMENTS
Constitutional Law-The Constitutionality of North Carolina's
Nuisance Abatement Statute: A Prior Restraint on
Nonobscene Speech
In 1977 North Carolina joined a growing number of states that have
sought alternatives to criminal obscenity prosecutions by allowing civil abate-
ment of obscenity as a public nuisance.1 Under North Carolina's abatement
statute,2 once the state proves at trial that a defendant has created a nuisance
by distributing pictorial obscenity, a court may issue a permanent injunction
barring distribution of materials judicially found obscene and any similar
items.3 The statute has survived constitutional attack on several occasions.
The North Carolina Supreme Court upheld the statute against broad constitu-
tional attacks in State ex rel Andrews v. Chateau X, Inc. (Andrews 1)4 and
again in State ex rel Andrews v. Chateau X, Inc. (Andrews I1).5 In 1982 the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, in the face of a narrower challenge, agreed
that the statute was constitutional in Fehlhaber v. North Carolina (Fehlhaber
I1),6 overturning the district court decision in Fehlhaber v. North Carolina
(Fehihaber 1).7 In dismissing the attacks, the courts held that North Carolina's
abatement statute creates no greater chill on speech than did the state's crimi-
nal obscenity statutes. Yet the North Carolina Supreme Court and the Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit failed to address adequately the constitu-
tionality of one provision of the abatement statute that permits creation of
prior restraints on speech by allowing permanent injunctions against materials
never judicially determined obscene.8 The position taken by the North Caro-
lina courts and the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit is contrary to
1. As of 1979 at least six other states had passed statutes specifically allowing abatement of
obscenity as a public nuisance. These states include Louisiana, Massachusetts, North Dakota,
Ohio, Texas, and Virginia. Arizona and California courts interpret existing nuisance statutes to
allow abatement of obscenity. 4A Nuisance Abatement Statute, That, When Applied to Obscenity,
Authorizes a Prior Restraint on the Future Exhibition of Unnamed Films Violates the United States
Constitution-Universal Amusement Co. v. Vance, 587 F.2d 159 (5th Cir. 1978), 13 GA. L. REV.
1076, 1077 n.l1 (1979) [hereinafter cited as .4 Nuisance Abatement Statute]. But see Note,,41a-
bama's Red Light Abatement Act Held Applicable to Obscene Movies as Permanently Enjoinable
Nuisances, 10 CuM. L. REv. 593, 600 (1980) (noting courts in Michigan, California, Illinois, New
Mexico, and Pennsylvania have refused to interpret existing "red light" abatement acts to include
obscenity).
2. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 19-1 to -8.3 (1978).
3. Id § 19-5. For text of § 19-5, see infra note 47.
4. 296 N.C. 251, 250 S.E.2d 603 (1979), vacated and remanded, 445 U.S. 947 (1980).
5. 302 N.C. 321, 275 S.E.2d 443 (1981). The North Carolina Supreme Court decisions in
Andrews I and II are discussed in Note, Constitutional Law-Control of Obscenity Through En-
forcement of a Nuisance Statute-Chateau X, Inc. v. State ex re. Andrews, 302 N.C. 321, 275
S.E.2d 443 (1981), 4 CAMPBELL L. REv. 139 (1981).
6. 675 F.2d 1365 (4th Cir. 1982).
7. 445 F. Supp. 130 (E.D.N.C. 1978). See infra notes 84-88 and accompanying text.
8. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 19-5 (1978). For a discussion of the permanent injunction provision
of the abatement statute, see infra note 47.
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current case law on prior restraints as represented in Freedman v. Maryland,9
which requires that the censor carry the burden of proof, that pretrial re-
straints must be limited, and that the defendant must be guaranteed a prompt,
final judicial determination on the merits of the case.' 0 This comment will
examine the law of prior restraints on free speech and the constitutionality of
North Carolina's nuisance abatement statute.
The principle that men should be allowed to speak freely, unencumbered
by government regulation, is deeply rooted in American social and legal tradi-
tion.1 This notion lies at the heart of the first amendment prohibition against
laws abridging the freedom of speech and press.' 2 Yet the right of free speech
confronts an equally strong force: the human tendency to suppress ideas
viewed as immoral, dangerous, or wrong.13 The tension created by these op-
posing fundamental concepts surfaces in several areas of constitutional law,'
4
but the conflict is most noticeable in the area of obscenity regulation.
5
9. 380 U.S. 51 (1965). For a discussion of Freedman, see infra notes 29-30 and accompany-
ing text.
10. Id at 58-59.
11. The early English press was controlled by the Crown through a system of licensing, and
opponents of the government were subject to prosecution for seditious libel. The licensing system
ended in the 17th century, but seditious libel prosecutions continued. The framers of the U.S.
Constitution and the first amendment were intent on ensuring the freedom of the American press
from such restraints. G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 1107-08 (10th ed. 1979). See infra
note 24 and accompanying text.
12. The first amendment provides in pertinent part: "Congress shall make no law ...
abridging the freedom of speech or of the press." U.S. CONsT. amend. I. The first amendment is
applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment, Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427
U.S. 539, 556 (1976); Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 707 (1931). The fourteenth
amendment provides:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of the citizens of the United States: nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
13. The urge to repress ideas repugnant to one's own has been recognized by the Supreme
Court as a threat to first amendment freedoms:
Persecution for the expression of opinions seems tome perfectly logical. If you have
no doubt of your premises or your power and want a certain result with all your heart
you naturally express your wishes in law and sweep away all opposition.... But...
the best test of truth is the power of thought to get itself accepted in the competition of
the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be
carried out.
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
14. Only two Supreme Court justices, William 0. Douglas and Hugo Black, have ever advo-
cated an "absolutist" view of the first amendment, in which freedom of speech and press may not
be infringed for any reason. Bosmajian, Introduction to W.O. DOUGLAS, JUSTICE DOUGLAS AND
FREEDOM OF SPEECH at xiv-xv (1980); G. GUNTHER, supra note 11, at 1113. The prevailing ap-
proach of the Supreme Court is to require a balancing of the first amendment and other interests
at stake. Id The difficulty of striking the correct balance, of course, increases with the perceived
evil or danger posed by the speech and the state's corresponding desire to suppress it. Certain
kinds of speech deemed to present particularly great danger have been excluded from first amend-
ment protection entirely. One example is speech posing a "clear and present danger" of illegal
action. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). Libel was at one time considered to be
completely outside the protection of the first amendment, Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S.
568, 572 (1942), but this view was repudiated by the Supreme Court in New York Times v. Sulli-
van, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964).
15. Ironically, religious and governmental censorship in early England was concerned more
[Vol. 61
PRIOR RESTRAINTS ON SPEECH
Regulation of obscenity poses particularly difficult problems because of
the strong competing interests involved. The desire to protect freedom of
speech may clash head-on with the wish to suppress material believed to un-
dermine the moral standards of society, the right of parents to raise children as
they wish, and even the economic and aesthetic value of neighborhoods. Judi-
cial and legislative attempts to balance these confficting interests have created
a body of law unequaled in confusion and instability. 16 Decisions are fre-
with political and religious themes than with obscenity. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 657 (1978). During the 17th century the influence of Puritanism in England brought with it
increasing restrictions against sexually-oriented materials. Nevertheless, there was virtually no
common-law rule against obscenity in the American colonies before the Revolution, and Massa-
chusetts was the only state with a statute on obscenity. Id The greatest growth in regulation of
obscenity in the United States occurred between 1820 and 1860. Id at 657-68. By 1942 Justice
Murphy was able to state unequivocally that obscenity was unprotected by the first amendment.
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942).
Numerous objections have been raised against obscenity and in support of regulation. Ob-
scenity has been described as "shameless exploitation of the frustrated and the compulsive," a
depiction of man "reduced to the sorry sum of his basest appetites." L. TRIBE, supra, at 668. It
has been viewed as a threat to moral training of children, an assault on the sensibilities of unwill-
ing adults, R. LISTON, THE RIGHT To KNOW 66-67 (1973), and a detriment to the economic and
aesthetic value of neighborhoods. Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 55 (1976).
There may be psychological and sociological reasons behind the intense emotions roused by ob-
scenity. "Suppression of the obscene persists because it [obscenity] tells us something about our-
selves that some of us, at least, would prefer not to know. It threatens to explode our uneasy
accommodation between sexual impulse and social custom--to destroy the carefully-spun social
web holding sexuality in its place." L. TRIBE, supra, at 669-70. Another author explains the de-
bate as a matter of social class tensions: "Resentment emerges as a secret, unconscious, unfocused
tension felt in members of [the lower middle class] who vaguely sense their inferior social position,
their lack of power and whose rage is contained by transforming self-denial into a virtue." Mc-
WILLIAMS in CENSORSHIP: FOR & AGAINST 89 (H. Hart ed. 1971).
16. The Supreme Court's efforts to distinguish obscenity from protected speech have "pro-
duced a variety of views among the members of the Court unmatched in any other course of
constitutional adjudication." Interstate Circuit Inc. v. Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 704-05 (1968)
(Harlan, J., concurring in part).
The first reported obscenity case in the United States was Commonwealth v. Sharpless, 2
Serg. & Rawle 91 (Pa. 1815), a Pennsylvania decision cited in L. TRIBE, supra note 15, at 658.
Prior to the late nineteenth century, however, few cases attempted to define obscenity. L. TRIBE,
supra note 15, at 658. American courts instead adopted the standard of an English case, Regina v.
Hicklin, 3 L.R.-Q.B. 360 (1868), which defined obscenity as that which has a tendency "to deprave
and corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences, and into whose hands a
publication of this sort may fall." Id at 368. This standard, which defines obscenity in terms of
the effect of isolated passages on the most susceptible audiences, prevailed in American courts
until the mid-1930s, when courts began to adopt a standard based on the effect of the dominant
theme of the work as a whole on the average reader. L. TRIBE, supra note 15, at 659. The
Supreme Court fully addressed the question of the proper standard for the first time in Roth v.
United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957): "whether to the average person, applying contemporary com-
munity standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to the prurient
interest." Id at 489. The Roth standard proved difficult to apply, however, and for the next
fifteen years the Court's opinions divided sharply on the issue of obscenity. It was not until 1973,
in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), that five justices agreed on a modified version of the
Roth test:
The basic guideline for the trier of fact must be: (a) whether the "average person, apply-
ing contemporary community standards" would find that the work, taken as a whole,
appeals to the prurient interest...; (b) whether the work depicts or describes in a pa-
tently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and
(c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political or scien-
tific value.
Id at 24.
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quently inconsistent, 17 and standards are difficult to apply.18 Of the few estab-
lished rules that have emerged from the obscenity decisions, perhaps the most
important is the rule placing material judicially pronounced obscene outside
the protection of the first amendment. 19 This rule is accompanied by a caveat,
however, because the line between protected and unprotected speech is often
"dim and uncertain," 20 states are not free to regulate suspected obscenity in
any way they choose. Rather, they are required to observe certain rules and
procedural safeguards.21
The need for these safeguards is especially great when state obscenity reg-
ulations create prior restraints on material presumptively protected by the first
amendment. A prior restraint is a restraint "imposed before the communica-
tion takes place, as distinguished from restrictions of speech imposed by subse-
quent punishment. ' 22  Prior restraints have long been viewed with great
suspicion by American courts23 because such restrictions forever deprive the
audience of the speaker's message. Indeed, the principle against prior re-
straints is traceable to Blackstone: "Every free man has an undoubted right to
lay what sentiments he pleases before the public; to forbid this, is to destroy
the freedom of the press; but if he publish what is improper, mischievous or
illegal, he must take the consequences of his own temerity." 24 Blackstone's
sentiments are repeated in the leading case discussing prior restraints, Near v.
Minnesota ex rel Olson.25 In Near the Supreme Court struck down a state
procedure for abatement of defamatory and scandalous newspapers as public
nuisances. The Court noted that a prime motive behind the enactment of the
first amendment was the framers' desire to avoid the restrictions and prior
restraints of speech that were typical of early England.26 Although any system
17. "IT]he present. . . standards are so intolerably vague that even-handed enforcement of
the law is a virtual impossibility .... [G]rossly disparate treatment of similar offenders is a
characteristic of the criminal enforcement of obscenity law." Marks v. United States, 430 U.S.
188, 198 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
18. Justice Brennan, who wrote the majority opinion in Roth, abandoned his own test of
obscenity sixteen years later in Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973). Justice Bren-
nan concluded that "none of the available formulas. . . can reduce the vagueness to a tolerable
level. . . ." Id at 84 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Stewart as well seems to have despaired of
finding a useable definition of obscenity. "I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of
material I understand to be embraced within that shorthand description; and perhaps I could
never succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I see it, and the motion picture involved
in this case is not that." Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
19. Roth held that obscenity is not "speech" in the first amendment sense, 354 U.S. at 485
(citing dictum in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)), but acknowledged that
regulation of obscenity may raise serious constitutional issues. "It is therefore vital that the stan-
dards for judging obscenity safeguard the protection of freedom of speech and press. . . ." 354
U.S. at 488. See also Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (discussed supra note 16). See
discussion of Roth, supra note 16.
20. Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 731 (1961). For further discussion of Marcus,
see infra note 33.
21. Id
22. G. GUNTHER, supra note 11, at 1374.
23. Id
24. 4 W. BLACKSTONE COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 152 (1902).
25. 283 U.S. 697, 713-14 (1931).
26. "[L]iberty of the press, historically considered and taken up by the Federal Constitution,
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of prior restraint comes before a court with a strong presumption against its
validity,27 prior restraints are not per se invalid. For instance, in Near the
Court noted that a prior restraint may be allowed to prevent obstruction of
military recruiting, harm to military troops, or violence or overthrow of the
United States Government as well as to uphold "the primary requirements of
decency."'28
In Freedman v. Maryland29 the Supreme Court held that prior restraints
may also be tolerated when certain procedural safeguards are provided.
Before a prior restraint on presumptively protected materials will be allowed,
a state must ensure that the would-be censor bears the burden of proving the
material obscene. Furthermore, restraints prior to judicial review must be lim-
ited to preservation of the status quo and will be allowed only fbr the shortest
period compatible with sound judicial procedure. Finally, the state must as-
sure a prompt, final judicial determination on the question of obscenity.30
While the prior restraint discussed in the Freedman case arose from a
state film-licensing statute,3 1 other forms of regulation may also constitute ille-
gal restrictions on speech. Because first amendment concerns pervade the en-
tire area of obscenity regulation,3 2 the rules against prior restraints may
severely limit the options available to a state seeking to regulate adult speech.
Procedures that have been stricken by courts as illegal prior restraints include
certain kinds of seizures of materials before trial on the merits,33 some licens-
has meant, principally, although not exclusively, immunity from previous restraints or censor-
ship." 283 U.S. at 716.
27. Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1968).
28. 283 U.S. at 716. The applicability of this particular phrase in nuisance abatement actions
against obscenity was discussed by the majority in Andrews 1, 296 N.C. at 266, 250 S.E.2d at 612
and the dissent in Fehlhaber I, 675 F.2d at 1371.
29. 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
30. Id at 58-59, cited in Andrews I, 302 N.C. at 325 n.5, 275 S.E.2d at 446 n.5.
31. Maryland law required motion picture operators to submit films to a state board of cen-
sors for approval before the films could be shown publicly. 380 U.S. at 52 n.2.
32. Edelstein & Mott, Collateral Problems in Obscenity Regulation: A Un/form Approach to
Prior Restraints, Community Standards, and Judgment Preclusion, 7 SETON HALL L. REv. 543, 546
(1976).
33. In a number of cases the Supreme Court has emphasized that seizures of presumptively
protected material may constitute an illegal prior restraint if adequate safeguards are not pro-
vided.
In Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717 (1961), the Court struck down a Missouri statute
that allowed mass seizure of allegedly obscene magazines prior to trial on the issue of obscenity.
In Marcus a city policeman filed a sworn complaint with the state trial court, alleging that the
appellant-bookstore owners were selling obscene publications. The trial judge issued a broad war-
rant, which did not name any specific items to be seized, after an exparte hearing and without
seeing any of the allegedly obscene materials. The Court held that the Missouri procedure af-
forded insufficient safeguards against infringement of nonobscene materials that might be sold by
appellants. The Court distinguished the pretrial seizure upheld in Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown,
354 U.S. 436 (1957), discussed infra note 60. In Kingsley the complaint named particular publica-
tions to be seized, and copies were attached for the judge to inspect before he issued a search
warrant. Further, the pretrial restraint was effective only against specific, named publications, and
state law required a prompt judicial decision on the question of obscenity of the seized materials.
367 U.S. at 735-36. For a discussion of the Marcus decision, see Note, Constitutional Law-Search
and Seizure-Proceduresfor Seizure of Obscene Publications, 26 Mo. L. REv. 501 (1961).
New York's pretrial seizure provisions were upheld by the Court in Heller v. New York, 413
U.S. 483 (1973). InHeller, a trial judge viewed an allegedly obscene film before issuing a warrant
1983]
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ing systems,34 harassment or arrests of distributors of sexually-oriented mater-
ials,35 and forced closures of businesses dealing in adult material.3 6 Courts
based on his finding that there was probable cause to believe the movie obscene. Only one copy of
the film was seized, for purposes of preserving evidence for trial, and there was no allegation that
the copy was the only one owned by the defendants. The Court held that there is no absolute right
to an adversarial hearing on the question of obscenity prior to seizure of allegedly obscene materi-
als. Id at 488. Due process safeguards are sufficient when material is seized pursuant to a war-
rant based on probable cause and the sole purpose of the seizure is the preservation of evidence.
Id at 490. If a defendant alleges that the copy seized is the only one available, he must be
allowed to make duplicates, so that distribution of the "speech" will not be halted prior to trial on
the merits. Id at 492-93.
Although the Heller Court held that there is no absolute requirement of an adversary hearing
before seizure of suspected obscenity as evidence, North Carolina's criminal obscenity statute re-
quires a separate judicial proceeding to determine if material is obscene prior to its use in a crimi-
nal obscenity prosecution. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-190.2 (1981); State ex rel Andrews v. Chateau X
44ndrews 1), 296 N.C. 251, 279-80, 250 S.E.2d 603, 620-21 (1979) (Exum, J., dissenting). This
requirement seems to reflect legislative recognition of the difficulty of defining obscenity and a
corresponding desire to provide maximum procedural safeguards for criminal defendants. See
296 N.C. at 277-79, 250 S.E.2d at 618-20 (Exum, J., dissenting).
In Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496 (1973), the companion case to Heller, the Court held
that a warrant is required even when material is seized incidental to a lawful arrest, and even if
the seizure is simply to preserve evidence. Before presumptively protected materials may be
seized, a neutral magistrate must have a chance to "focus searchingly" on the question of the
probable obscenity of the matter. Id at 506.
In Roaden, a county sheriff viewed a film, then arrested the theatre owner and seized the film.
The Court held that the seizure, conducted without a warrant, was unreasonable under the fourth
and fourteenth amendments:
Seizing a film then being exhibited to the general public presents essentially the same
restraint on expression as the seizure of all the books in a bookstore. Such precipitate
action by a police officer, without the authority of a constitutionally sufficient warrant, is
plainly a form of prior restraint and is, in those circumstances, unreasonable...
413 U.S. at 504. The Court noted, however, that allegedly obscene materials may be seized with-
out a warrant, if the seizure occurs under "exigent circumstances," such as when the evidence
would disappear permanently if not seized immediately. Id at 505. See the discussion of.Roaden
in Note, Tennessee Nuisance Statute Declared Unconstitutional, 4 MEM. S.U.L. REv. 619 (1974).
Lower court decisions discussing seizures of allegedly obscene materials include Penthouse
Int'l, Ltd. v. McAuliffe, 610 F.2d 1353 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Echols, 577 F.2d 308 (5th
Cir. 1978); Eagle Books, Inc. v. Ritchie, 455 F. Supp. 64 (N.D. Utah 1978); Maguin v. Miller, 433
F. Supp. 223 (D. Kan. 1977); First Amendment Found. of Fla., Inc., v. State, 364 So. 2d 450 (Fla.
1978); People v. Hobbs, 59 Ill. App. 3d 793, 375 N.E.2d 1367 (1978); Hollington v. Ricco, 40 Ohio
App. 2d 57, 318 N.E.2d 442 (1973).
34. Although the Supreme Court recognizes the right of the state to license first amendment
activities, Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 62 (1976), there are certain limits
on that right. For instance, a license may not be revoked or withheld on the basis of past criminal
convictions or other misconduct of the applicant or licensee. Such a denial of the right to dissemi-
nate material presumptively protected by the first amendment constitutes an illegal prior restraint
if based solely on past conduct. Cornflower Entertainment, Inc. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 485 F.
Supp. 777 (D. Utah 1980); Natco Theatres, Inc. v. Ratner, 463 F. Supp. 1124 (S.D.N.Y. 1979);
City of Springfield v. Hall, 93 Ill. App. 3d 860, 417 N.E.2d 1059 (1981); Hamar Theatres, Inc. v.
City of Newark, 150 N.J. Super. 14,374 A.2d 502 (App. Div. 1977); People v. J.W. Productions, 98
Misc. 2d 69, 413 N.Y.S.2d 552 (Crim. Ct. 1979). A licensing system may also be an illegal prior
restraint if it gives excessive discretion to an administrative licensing board: "the danger of cen-
sorship and of abridgment of our precious First Amendment freedoms is too great where officials
have unbridled discretion over a forum's use." Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S.
546, 553 (1975). An unduly time-consuming and cumbersome licensing system was stricken as a
prior restraint in'State v. Huddleston, 412 A.2d 1148 (Del. Super. 1980). City of Minot v. Central
Ave. News, Inc., 308 N.W.2d 851 (N.D. 1981), held that licensing fees must be nominal or limited
to the amount necessary to defray administrative expenses.
35. Harassment may take the form of police raids on adult theatres, as in Maguin v. Miller,
433 F. Supp. 223 (D. Kan. 1977). The Maguin court found a prior restraint based on evidence that
police forced patrons of adult theatres to give their names and addresses to officers, seized tickets
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have also held that a seller's contractual agreement to a prior restraint will not
from the theatre office, and arrested employees on several occasions. Id at 230. In Black Jack
Distribs., Inc. v. Beame, 433 F. Supp. 1297 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), a city building inspector repeatedly
charged adult bookstore owners with building code violations, forcing businesses to close for brief
periods. The court said that although the state
may vigorously enforce obscenity laws when the purpose is to punish the promotion or
sale of obscene material, or deter such promotion or sale[,]... law enforcement will run
afoul of the Constitution if the purpose is to force a sexually oriented enterprise to cease
doing business or to refrain from dealing in presumably protected sexually oriented
materials.
Id at 1305 (emphasis in original).
A similar kind of prior restraint is created when officials circulate "blacklists" of disapproved
material and, by threatening dealers, seek to discourage distribution of the material. Bantam
Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963). Threats made by a county sheriff against theatre
owners who showed any films other than those rated for general audiences were held to constitute
an illegal prior restraint in Drive in Theatres, Inc. v. Huskey, 435 F.2d 228 (4th Cir. 1970). In
Penthouse Int'l, Ltd. v. McAuliffe, 610 F.2d 1354 (5th Cir. 1980), a series of arrests of employees
of a sexually-oriented business was held to constitute constructive seizure of presumptively pro-
tected materials since the arrests were designed to force the business to remove adult magazines
from distribution. Id at 1360.
36. Many courts agree that a blanket closure provision-closing a building for all purposes
for a set period-is an illegal prior restraint because it bars future speech based on past violations
of obscenity or nuisance laws. See General Corp. v. State ex rel Sweeton, 294 Ala. 657, 320 So.
2d 668 (1975); Sanders v. State, 231 Ga. 608, 203 S.E.2d 153 (1974); Gulf State Theatres of La.,
Inc. v. Richardson, 287 So. 2d 480 (La. 1973); Society to Oppose Pornography, Inc. v. Thevis, 255
So. 2d 876 (La. App. 1971); City of Minot v. Central Ave. News, Inc., 308 N.W.2d 851 (N.D.
1981); New Rivieria Arts Theatre v. State ex rel Davis, 219 Tenn. 652, 412 S.W.2d 890 (1967).
.But see People ex rel Hicks v. Sarong Gals, 42 Cal. App. 3d 556, 117 Cal. Rptr. 24 (1974) (up-
holding blanket one-year closure); State ex rel Calahan v. Diversified Theatrical Corp., 59 Mich.
App. 223, 229 N.W.2d 389 (1975) (one-year closure), rev'd on other grounds, 396 Mich. 244, 240
N.W.2d 460 (1976) (nuisance statute not applicable to films); State ex rel Ewing v. A Motion
Picture Film Entitled "Without a Stitch," 37 Ohio St. 2d 95, 307 N.E.2d 911 (1974) (one-year
closure). The Supreme Court has never directly faced the question whether a total padlocking
order constitutes an illegal prior restraint on speech. The Court agreed to hear the issue in 1981,
but later dismissed the case on procedural grounds. State ex rel Kidwell v. United States Mktg.,
Inc., 102 Idaho 451, 631 P.2d 622 (1981), appeal dismissed sub nom. United States Mktg., Inc. v.
Idaho, 102 S. Ct. 1649 (1982).
There is less agreement over whether a "limited" closure order is legal. A partial padlocking
order closes a business only to the extent necessary to prevent continuation of the nuisance, thus
allowing use of the building for other purposes. Courts in many states have held that even a
limited closure order creates an illegal prior restraint:
The theory expressed is that under the First Amendment all forms of expression are
protected until an adversary hearing has been held and the material has been found
obscene by a judicial official. Thus, under this theory, after nuisance-abatement pro-
ceedings it is lawful to confiscate obscene items and to enjoin further sale or exhibition of
named items found to be obscene, but the injunction cannot close the establishment or
generally prohibit future sales or exhibition of similiar material.
Watts, Obscenity, in 1977 NORTH CAROLINA LEGIsLATION 219 (1977). Compare Society to Op-
pose Pornography, Inc. v. Thevis, 255 So. 2d 876 (La. App. 1971) (partial closure permissible
although total closure illegal) with People ex rel Busch v. Projection Room Theater, 17 Cal. 3d 42,
550 P.2d 600, 130 Cal. Rptr. 328, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976) (partial closure invalid).
Although, in light of these decisions, North Carolina's abatement statute should not be read
to allow a complete closure order, it is unclear whether the statute permits a partial padlocking.
The abatement act provides that after the existence of the nuisance is established an order of
abatement may be entered which requires "the effectual closing of the place against its use thereaf-
ter for the purpose of conducting any such nuisance." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 19-5 (1981). The North
Carolina Supreme Court inAndrewsI refused to interpret § 19-5, but noted its agreement with the
State's concession that "any complete closing of a business for past sales of obscene material
would constitute illegal prior restraint." 296 N.C. at 258, 250 S.E.2d at 608. The State argued that
the statute authorized a limited closure order. Plaintiff Appellees' Supplemental Brief at 7-8,.An-
drews1. Justice Exum, dissenting in Andrews I, noted language in several sections of Chapter 19,
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save the agreement from being stricken as unconstitutional.37
Constitutional questions concerning prior restraints also arise when states
attempt to abate obscenity as a nuisance. Nuisances fall into two rather vague
categories-private nuisance, described as "a civil wrong, based on a distur-
bance of rights in land,"38 and public nuisance, which is "a species of catch-all
criminal offense, consisting of an interference with the rights of the community
at large."3 9 For example, a private nuisance could be created by a factory that
produces large amounts of noise and smoke, but disturbs only the adjoining
landowners' use and enjoyment of their property. A public nuisance "may
include anything from the obstruction of a highway to a public gaming-house
or indecent exposure."4 While the private landowner is responsible for seek-
ing a remedy for a private nuisance, the state may prosecute for a public nui-
sance. 41 At common law, nuisances could be abated in a civil action, but early
North Carolina courts usually controlled obscenity through criminal prosecu-
tion instead.42
Recently, the civil abatement approach has become increasingly attractive
to many states because the abatement procedure offers several advantages over
a criminal obscenity prosecution. For instance, most abatement statutes per-
mit preliminary injunctions against suspected obscene materials, thus provid-
ing a rapid, efficient means of halting distribution of the materials before trial
on the merits. Moreover, because abatement is an action in equity, a jury trial
is not required.43 An additional advantage is the lower standard for burden of
§§ 19-2.1, -5, -6 and -7, that seems to authorize closures of some kind. See 296 N.C. at 269, 250
S.E.2d at 614.
At least one observer has argued that § 19-5 was originally drafted to allow blanket closures,
but was amended by the General Assembly prior to passage of the final version to allow only
limited closures. Watts, supra, at 214.
37. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd. v. Putka, 436 F. Supp. 1220 (N.D. Ohio 1977).
38. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTs 572 (4th ed. 1971). See generally Rendleman, Civilizing
Pornography: The Casefor an Exclusive Obscenity Nuisance Statute, 44 U. CHI. L. REv. 509, 523
(1977); A Nuisance Abatement Statute, supra note 1.
39. W. PROSSER, supra note 38, at 573. North Carolina law defines nuisances that may be
abated under Chapter 19 as "Itlhe erection, establishment, continuance, maintenance, use, owner-
ship or leasing of any building or place for the purpose of assignation, prostitution, gambling,
illegal possession or sale of intoxicating liquors, illegal possession or sale of narcotic drugs. .., or
illegal possession or sale of obscene or lewd matter, as defined in this Chapter. . . ." N.C. GEN.
STAT. §19-1 (1978).
40. W. PROSSER, supra note 38, at 573. In the early 20th century, "redlight" abatement stat-
utes were enacted by many states to close down businesses used for gambling, prostitution, and
other "lewd" activities. Rendleman, supra note 38, at 523. Today, some states are trying to con-
strue these existing red light abatement statutes to permit abatement of obscenity, instead of for-
mally amending the statutes as North Carolina's General Assembly did. Some courts have been
willing to "read" the red light statutes to include obscenity, while others have held the general
language of the red light statutes too vague to be applied to material presumptively protected by
the first amendment. Id at 523-25.
41. W. PROSSER, supra note 38, at 572-73.
42. See Hogue, Regulating Obscenity hrough the Power to Define and Abate Nuisances, 14
WAKE FOREST L. Rav. 1, 4 (1978).
43. A Nuisance Abatement Statute, supra note 1, at 1077 n.12. North Carolina's nuisance
abatement statute, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 19-2.4 (1978), however, gives the defendant the right.to a
jury trial on the issue of existence of the initial nuisance. There is no right to a jury trial in a later
contempt hearing, however. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 19-4 (1978).
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proof. The state may prove existence of the nuisance by a preponderance of
the evidence, rather than by the more stringent criminal standard of beyond a
reasonable doubt.44
The United States Supreme Court has "acknowledged the value of this
approach to the solution of the vexing problem of reconciling state efforts to
suppress sexually-oriented expression within the prohibitions of the First
Amendment. '45 Yet at least one member of the Court has also warned that
civil abatement procedures may provide insufficient procedural safeguards
and thus pose a "danger that the dissemination of constitutionally protected
material will be suppressed."46
A typical nuisance abatement statute provides that a district attorney or
other official may initiate a court action to enjoin dissemination of allegedly
obscene materials. If the items are found obscene at trial, the court may de-
clare both the materials and the business itself a nuisance. The court usually
has the power to issue a permanent injunction against continuance of the nui-
sance;47 the court may also order destruction of obscene materials, 48 seizure of
proceeds from sales of obscene materials, 49 and, in some cases, closure of the
premises. 50 Violations of the court injunction are punishable by a contempt
prosecution. 5'
Prior to 1977, North Carolina's nuisance statute applied only to gambling,
sale of drugs and liquor, and prostitution.5 2 The statute was amended, how-
ever, in 1977, when the General Assembly added to the list of abateable nui-
sances the category of pictorial obscenity.53 With this addition, North
44. A Nuisance Abatement Statute, supra note 1, at 1077 n.12. The Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals inFehlhaberll argued that the North Carolina Supreme Court requires the state to prove
existence of a nuisance beyond a reasonable doubt. See infra note 57.
45. McKinney v. Alabama, 424 U.S. 669, 679 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring in result).
46. Id at 683 (Brennan, J., concurring in result).
47. The North Carolina abatement statute provides in pertinent part:
If the existence of a nuisance is admitted or established in an action as provided for in
this Chapter an order of abatement shall be entered as a part of the judgment in the case,
which judgment and order shall perpetually enjoin the defendant and any other person
from further maintaining the nuisance at the place complained of, and the defendant
from maintaining such nuisance elsewhere within the jurisdiction of this State. Lewd
matter, illegal intoxicating liquors, gambling paraphernalia, or substances proscribed
under the North Carolina Controlled Substances Act shall be destroyed and not sold.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 19-5 (1978).
48. Id
49. Id
50. Seesupra note 36 (discussing padlocking). Despite language, supra note 47, in N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 19-5 (1978) that seems to permit some kind of closure order, it is unclear whether courts
will interpret the statute to allow padlocking of a nuisance.
51. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 19-4 (1978). The statute provides penalties for contempt including
fines ranging from $200 to $1,000 and imprisonment for three to six months. For the text of the
statute, see infra note 110.
52. See Act of June 23, 1971, ch. 655, 1971 N.C. Sess. Laws 622 (codified as amended at N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 19-1 (1978)). See also Hogue, supra note 42, at 4.
53. Act of June 30, 1977, ch. 819, § 3, 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws, 1st Sess. 1107, 1107-09 (codified
in pertinent part at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 19-1(a), -1.1 to -1.2 (1978)). For a discussion of the
s'nificance of the statute's distinction between "pictorial" and "written" obscenity, see infra note
t5oUnder the amended abatement act, the district attorney or state attorney general may begin
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Carolina joined the ranks of a growing number of states attempting to control
obscenity through nuisance actions.
The first challenge to the statute came in Stale ex relAndrews v. Chateau
X, Inc. (Andrews I), after officials attempted to have the Chateau X bookstore
in Jacksonville, North Carolina declared a nuisance and permanently en-
joined from operation.54 The trial judge declared the store a nuisance and
enjoined defendant operators from further distribution of items specifically
found obscene at trial. He also permanently enjoined distribution of any other
materials depicting certain specified sexual acts, even though the materials
were not actually before the court.55 The judge went on to rule that the store
could not be closed, despite language in G.S. 19-5 that authorizes a final judi-
cial order to "require the effectual closing of the place against its use thereafter
for the purpose of conducting any such nuisance." Although the trial judge
read the statute as authorizing padlocking the building, he stated that such a
closure order would constitute an illegal prior restraint on speech.
56
On appeal the chief contention of defendants was that the broad perma-
nent injunctions permitted under section 19-5 of the abatement statute created
illegal prior restraints on presumptively protected material by restricting dis-
tribution of items never judicially determined obscene.5 7 The North Carolina
an abatement action by filing a complaint stating the facts constituting the nuisance. The com-
plaint is filed in the superior court of the county in which the nuisance is located. N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 19-2.1 (1978). The official may apply for an ex parte temporary restraining order to pre-
serve evidence of the nuisance. .d. § 19-2.3 (1978). The defendant may counter with a motion to
dissolve the temporary restraining order, his motion must be heard within 24 hours of service of
the notice on the plaintiff, or on the next day the superior courts of the county are open, whichever
is later. Id State officials may also seek a preliminary injunction to restrain operation of the
nuisance before trial. Id. § 19-2.2 (1978). A hearing on the preliminary injunction motion must
be held within 10 days after the application is filed. Id On the motion of the court or any party,
trial on the merits may be consolidated with the hearing on the preliminary injunction. Id. § 19-
2.4 (1978). If the two hearings are not consolidated, trial on the merits must be held no later than
the next term of court, and the case receives precedence over most other civil cases. Id. § 19-3
(1978). If the existence of a nuisance is proven at trial, which may be before a jury, an order
requiring destruction of obscene materials, closure of the premises, and forfeiture of the proceeds
from sales of obscenity may be issued. Id. § 19-5, quoted supra note 47. The court may also
permanently enjoin the continuance of any "such nuisance" in the future. Id Hogue, supra note
42, and Watts, supra note 36, contain excellent, detailed discussions of the North Carolina abate-
ment provisions.
54. 296 N.C. 251, 252-53, 250 S.E.2d 603, 604-05 (1979).
55. Id at 255, 250 S.E.2d at 606.
56. Id at 258, 250 S.E.2d at 607.
57. Id at 262-63, 250 S.E.2d at 610. Defendants also argued that § 19-1.1(2) illegally places
the burden of proof on defendants to show that the items are not obscene. The North Carolina
Supreme Court disagreed, but did not specify whether the state must prove obscenity beyond a
reasonable doubt or merely by a preponderance of the evidence in the initial nuisance proceeding.
Id at 260-61, 250 S.E.2d at 609. TheAndrews I court did hold that the State must prove violation
of an injunction beyond a reasonable doubt in any contempt proceedings under Chapter 19. Id at
264, 250 S.E.2d at 611.
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Fehihaber II apparently read theAndrews I opinion
as requiring the State to prove the existence of the initial nuisance and violation of an injunction
beyond a reasonable doubt. The court noted that Chapter 19 "leaves unclear several questions,
including the nature of the burden of persuasion resting upon the state during the abatement
proceeding and during any contempt proceeding." 675 F.2d at 1368. In a portion of the opinion
discussing the nuisance proceeding the court noted that the Andrews. I court had "construed the
statute and placed upon the state the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt all elements of
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Supreme Court rejected defendants' argument. The court said the term "prior
restraint" is typically used to describe seizures of, or preliminary injunctions
against, materials that have not been judicially declared obscene, or to de-
scribe licensing systems that interfere with presumptively protected speech.58
The term is not ordinarily applied to permanent injunctions imposed after trial
on the merits. Even if a permanent injunction could constitute a prior re-
straint, the court continued, prior restraints are not per se invalid.5 9 Citing the
United States Supreme Court decision in Kingsley Books v. Brown,60 the ma-
jority observed that courts have allowed restraints on speech when the result-
the offense." 675 F.2d at 1369. The conclusion that the Fehlhaber II court was discussing the
nuisance proceeding in the first part of its opinion is bolstered by the fact that a discussion of the
State's burden of proof in the contempt proceeding appears later in the Fehihaber HI opinion.
"[A]ny contempt citation upon an alleged violation of the injunction was not subject to North
Carolina's summary contempt disposition procedures, but only to the state's plenary procedures,
during which the state must shoulder the burden of proof of all elements of the offense beyond a
reasonable doubt." 675 F.2d at 1369.
The defendants' second objection was that the final order enjoined protected matter because
it failed to limit the scope of the injunction to matter that is "patently offensive." 296 N.C. at 261,
250 S.E.2d at 609. The North Carolina Supreme Court held that this deviation from the standard
of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 19-1.1(2) (1978) and Miller was not fatal. Id For a discussion of the Miller
definition of obscenity, see supra note 16.
The State claimed that the trial court erred by enjoining only the distribution of enlarged
pictures of genitalia, arguing that § 19-5 requires the abatement order to prohibit dissemination of
all such matter. 296 N.C. at 255-56, 250 S.E.2d at 606. The appellate court held that a trial judge
must have the discretion to make permanent injunctions specific; he is not required to enjoin all
material that may be obscene under § 19-1.1(2) of the abatement statute. While the Andrews I
court upheld the trial judge's injunction against materials not actually before the court, it cau-
tioned that its decision did not extend to whether a trial judge must always issue a broad injunc-
tion, or whether the permanent injunction may be limited to items specifically adjudicated
obscene. Id at 256, 250 S.E.2d at 606-07.
The State also objected that the trial court's permanent injunction was limited to material
that constituted a substantial portion of the defendant's stock in trade. The State claimed that
permanent injunctions must issue against sales of all obscene items, even if an item is the only
obscene thing in the store. Id at 257, 250 S.E.2d at 607. The North Carolina Supreme Court
again disagreed. A publication constitutes an abateable nuisance only when the place in which
the publication is found is a nuisance, the court said. A business is a nuisance only when a large
percentage of the stock is obscene under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 19-1.2(5) (1978). Therefore, isolated
sales of obscene matter do not constitute a nuisance unless the items are a substantial part of the
defendant's stock in trade. Id
Finally, the State agreed that the trial court erred in interpreting § 19-5 to allow total closure
orders against a business. While the State conceded such an order would be an illegal prior re-
straint, it believed a "partial" closure order would be constitutionally permissible. Plaintiff Appel-
lees' Supplemental Brief at 7-8, 4ndrews I. A partial closure order would shut down a business
only for the purpose of preventing continuation of the nuisance; all other uses of the premises
would be allowed. The North Carolina Supreme Court agreed that a blanket closure order would
constitute an illegal prior restraint, but held that the padlocking issue was not properly before it,
and thus refused to determine the exact meaning of the closure language of § 19-5. 296 N.C. at
258, 250 S.E.2d at 608. For a discussion of padlocking, see supra note 36.
58. 296 N.C. at 263, 250 S.E.2d at 610.
59. Id
60. 354 U.S. 436 (1957). In Kingsley the United States Supreme Court upheld a New York
statute that allows preliminary injunctions to issue against alleged obscenity, provided certain
safeguards are followed. The Court upheld the statute based on its conclusion that it was less
burdensome than New York's criminal procedures. 354 U.S. at 444. Although the Kingsley "in-
junctions vs. criminal prosecution" test was also used in Vance v. Universal Amusement Co., Inc.,
445 U.S. 308 (1980), discussed infra note 73 and accompanying text, it is not clear that this stan-
dard is the proper test to measure prior restraints created by nuisance abatement statutes. Also
questionable is the North Carolina Supreme Court's failure to consider the Freedman standards,
which were discussed in Vance.
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ing "chill" is less than that created by the general in terrorem effect of a
criminal obscenity statute.6 '
Based on the Kingsley comparison of the relative burdens imposed on
defendants by criminal and abatement statutes, the North Carolina Supreme
Court held that the state abatement statute chills speech no more than a crimi-
nal statute does. The court pointed out that the trial judge's order in Andrews
I enjoined only material specifically within the statutory definition of obscen-
ity,62 thus providing more notice to defendant than he would receive from a
criminal obscenity statute. In addition, the same consequences-fine and im-
prisonment-face defendants who violate either a permanent injunction or the
criminal obscenity law.63 Further, in both criminal and nuisance proceedings,
the burden of proof rests on the State,64 and nonobscenity of the material is
always a defense.65 Although a defendant is not entitled to a jury trial in a
contempt action based on charges he has violated a permanent injunction,
there is no constitutional right to a jury trial in criminal contempt actions if the
penalty does not exceed six months imprisonment.66 Section 19-4 of North
Carolina's abatement statute provides for a maximum fine of $1,000 and up to
six months imprisonment on conviction of contempt.67
The North Carolina Supreme Court also held the Near rule against prior
restraints inapplicable to nuisance abatement actions involving obscenity. The
court characterized Near as dealing primarily with protection of political
speech, and pointed to dictum indicating that restraints against obscene speech
are permissible.68 Moreover, the Near Court was concerned about the lack of
specificity of the injunction, whereas the injunction against Chateau X was
61. 296 N.C. at 263-64, 250 S.E.2d at 611.
62. The trial court enjoined the defendants from:
d. Possessing for exhibition to the public illegal, lewd matter consisting of films which
appeals [sic] to the prurient interest in sex without serious literary, artistic, educa-
tional, political or scientific value and that depicts or shows:
(I) Persons engaging in sodomy, per os, or per anum,
(2) Enlarged exhibits of the genitals of male and female persons during acts of
sexual intercourse, or
(3) Persons engaging in masturbation.
e. Possessing for sale and in selling illegal lewd matter which constitutes a principal or
substantial part of the stock in trade at a place of business consisting of magazines,
books, and papers which appeal to the prurient interest in sex without serious liter-
ary, artistic, educational, political, or scientific value and that depicts or shows:
(I) Persons engaging in sodomy, per os, or per anum,
(2) Enlarged exhibits of the genitals of male and female persons during acts of
sexual intercourse, or
(3) Persons engaging in masturbation.
296 N.C. at 255, 250 S.E.2d at 606. Compare the statutory definition of obscenity under N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 19-1.1 (1978), discussed infra note 136.
63. 296 N.C. at 264-65, 250 S.E.2d at 611.
64. Id at 264, 250 S.E.2d at 611. It is unclear, however, whether the North Carolina
Supreme Court would require the State to prove existence of the initial nuisance beyond a reason-
able doubt or only by a preponderance of the evidence. See supra note 57.
65. 296 N.C. at 264, 250 S.E.2d at 611.
66. Id at 264-65, 250 S.E.2d at 611 (citing Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488 (1974)).
67. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 19-4 (1978).
68. 296 N.C. at 266, 250 S.E.2d at 612.
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narrowly drawn "and the prohibited conduct [was] specifically defined. ' 69
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court,70 Andrews I was vacated
and remanded for further consideration in light of the Court's holding in
Vance v. Universal Amusement Co.71 The appellee in Vance claimed that
Texas' civil nuisance abatement statute authorized unconstitutional prior re-
straints by allowing injunctions against "the commercial manufacturing ...
distribution, or... exhibition of obscene material." 72 The Supreme Court
limited its review in Vance to whether an injunction under the Texas statute
created a greater restraint on protected speech than that created "by any crimi-
nal statute."'73 In a brief per curiam opinion, the Court found the Texas abate-
ment law to be more onerous than a criminal obscenity statute. The Court
emphasized two aspects of the Texas law: nonobscenity was not always a de-
fense to a charge of contempt,74 and the statute lacked "any special safeguards
governing the entry and review of orders restraining the exhibition of...
motion pictures."75
On remand, the North Carolina Supreme Court in State ex rel Andrews v.
Chateau X Inc. (Andrews 11) considered only whether the Vance holding ap-
plied to North Carolina's nuisance abatement statute.76 The Andrews II ma-
jority believed the Texas statute was different from the North Carolina statute
in one important respect: under the Texas statute a defendant could be found
guilty of contempt if he sold materials in violation of the injunction, even if
the materials were later proven to be nonobscene. 77 Since nonobsceity is al-
ways a defense to a contempt charge in North Carolina, the Andrews II court
held that "the principles enunciated in Vance do not control .. "78
The sole dissenter in Andrews I and II, Justice Exum, agreed that North
Carolina's abatement statute should be upheld. Justice Exum disagreed, how-
ever, with the majority's interpretation of G.S. 19-5. Exum argued G.S. 19-5
permits permanent injunctions only against materials actually determined ob-
scene by a court.79 Allowing broader injunctions would be unconstitutional.80
The majority's argument that a broad injunction is permissible because it cre-
69. Id at 267, 250 S.E.2d at 613.
70. 445 U.S. 947 (1980).
71. 445 U.S. 308 (1980) (per curiam). For a discussion of the lower court rulings in Vance,
see infra note 72 andA Nuisance Abatement Statute, supra note 1. The Supreme Court's ruling in
Vance is discussed in Comment, Prior Restraint of Obscenity As .4 Public Nuisance-Vance v.
Universal Amusement Co., Inc., 26 N.Y.S. L.S. REv. 1122 (1981) and Note, supra note 5, at 145.
72. 445 U.S. at 310. The federal district court held the Texas statute created illegal prior
restraints by allowing injunctions against showing films that had never been judicially determined
obscene. A split panel of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court, but the
panel's decision was reversed in an en banc rehearing by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. 445
U.S. at 311-14.
73. Id at 314-15.
74. Id at 316.
75. Id at 317.
76. See 302 N.C. 321, 323, 275 S.E.2d 443, 445 (1981).
77. Id at 328-29, 275 S.E.2d at 447-48.
78. Id at 330, 275 S.E.2d at 449.
79. 296 N.C. at 268-69, 250 S.E.2d at 614 (Exum, J., dissenting).
80. Id at 271, 250 S.E.2d at 615 (Exum, J., dissenting).
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ates no greater restraint on speech than does a criminal statute "is an old one"
that was rejected by the Supreme Court inNear.81 The dissent also contended
that construing G.S. 19-5 restrictively to allow injunctions only against materi-
als judicially determined obscene would be more compatible with North Caro-
lina's criminal obscenity statutes82 and the general trend of decisions in other
jurisdictions.83
The North Carolina nuisance abatement statute was under attack in the
federal courts as well. Plaintiff operators of adult businesses in Fehlhaber v.
North Carolina (Fehihaber I) alleged that Chapter 19 of the North Carolina
statutes created illegal prior restraints on speech.84 The federal district court
agreed with plaintiffs' main contention and held that G.S. 19-5 creates an ille-
gal prior restraint by permitting permanent injunctions against materials not
judicially determined to be obscene.85 The court noted that such orders tradi-
tionally have been invalidated as unconstitutional.8 6 The state's contrary ar-
gument was supported only by a split decision of the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals in Vance v. Universal Amusement Co. 87 The Fehlhaber I court also
81. Id at 278, 250 S.E.2d at 619-20 (Exum, J., dissenting).
82. Id at 270, 250 S.E.2d at 615 (Exum, J., dissenting).
83. Id at 271-72, 250 S.E.2d at 615 (citing Mitchem v. Schaub, 250 So. 2d 883 (Fla. 1971);
Parish of Jefferson v. Bayou Landing Ltd., 350 So. 2d 158, 165-68 (La. 1977); New Rivieria Arts
Theatre v. State, 219 Tenn. 652, 412 S.W.2d 890 (1967)). See also infra notes 88, 149 and accom-
panying text.
84. 445 F. Supp. 130, 136 (E.D.N.C. 1978),rev'dinparl, 675 F.2d 1365 (4th Cir. 1982). Plain-
tiffs unsuccessfully attacked N.C. GEN. STAT. § 19-2.3 (1978), which permits a court to issue an ex
parte temporary restraining order on an application from the complainant showing good cause.
The order may restrain the defendant and other persons from removing or altering evidence in the
nuisance action, but may not restrict distribution of suspected obscene matter prior to trial on the
merits. Id, citedin FehlhaberHI, 675 F.2d at 1367. The court held that the TRO provision did not
create an illegal prior restraint on protected speech because the orders are designed only to pre-
serve the status quo and may extend only until the preliminary injunction hearing. In the interim
a defendant may move for dismissal of the TRO, and a hearing must be held within 24 hours. 445
F. Supp. at 135 (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 19-2.3 (1978)).
Plaintiffs were also unsuccessful in their attack on another aspect of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 19-2.3
(1978), which permits a court to order a business subject to a temporary restraining order to keep
an inventory of materials sold after the TRO becomes effective. Defendant argued that this provi-
sion creates an illegal restraint by requiring the business to record the names of customers. The
court held the statute does not require defendant-storeowners to record customers' names, how-
ever, and upheld the statute. 445 F. Supp. at 136.
The plaintiffs also challenged N.C. GEN. STAT. § 19-6 (1978), which provides that the owner
of a building housing a business that has been declared a nuisance by a court has the option of
voiding the defendant-lessee's lease. The Fehihaber I court refused to consider whether the statute
created a prior restraint, however, as the issue was not properly before the court. 445 F. Supp. at
140.
The fourth statutory provision challenged, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 19-8.2 (1978), provides that
certain health officials may enter and inspect a building where a suspected nuisance is maintained.
The court noted in dictum that the provision did not appear to create an illegal restraint, although
it refused to decide the issue. 445 F. Supp. at 140.
Plaintiffs' final objection to Chapter 19 was their claim that N.C. GEN. STAT. § 19-2.3 (1978)
constitutes an illegal search. Section 19-2.3 provides that after a temporary restraining order is
entered against a defendant-storeowner, police may make an inventory of the items sold at the
store. The court held the provision does not authorize a bona fide search, but rather allows police
to take note of items in plain view. 445 F. Supp. at 136.
85. 445 F. Supp. at 137-40.
86. Id at 138-40.
87. Id at 139. See discussion of Vance, supra notes 71-77 and accompanying text.
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pointed out that seven state supreme courts have invalidated similar injunc-
tions as invalid prior restraints on speech.88
In Fehlhaber v. North Carolina (Fehlhaber 1)89 the Fourth Circuit Court
of Appeals reversed the district court, holding that the permanent injunction
against sales of similar material did not create an illegal prior restraint.90 The
court believed that the injunction gave sufficient notice of the kinds of material
that were forbidden:
If [defendant]. . . reopens an "adult bookstore" and fills it with ex-
plicit displays of sexual activity altogether comparable with the
materials for the sale of which he has already been found to be in
violation of the law, the fact that different couples were performing
does not detract from the adequacy of his forewarning.91
The Fourth Circuit also noted that the North Carolina Supreme Court deci-
sions in Andrews I and 192 had removed several potential constitutional flaws
from the statute.93
The court added that the North Carolina abatement statute does not suf-
fer from the same vices as the Texas law invalidated in Vance. 94 According to
the Fourth Circuit, the Texas act was void because it permitted restraints of
indefinite duration against presumptively protected material.95 A second
ground for invalidation was the possibility that a defendant could be found
guilty of selling certain items in violation of an injunction even if the items
were later held to be nonobscene. 96 In contrast, North Carolina's abatement
statutes do not permit indefinite restraints. A defendant may move for trial on
the merits as soon as a preliminary injunction is issued, and the case receives
scheduling priority over almost all other civil actions.97 The court also
pointed out that in North Carolina nonobscenity is a defense to a contempt
charge.98
88. Id at 138 (citing General Corp. v. State, 294 Ala. 657, 320 So. 2d 688 (1975); Busch v.
Projection Room Theatre, 17 Cal. 3d 42, 550 P.2d 600, 130 Cal. Rptr. 328 (1976); Mitchem v. State
ex rel Schaub, 250 So. 2d 883 (Fla. 1971); Sanders v. State, 231 Ga. 608, 203 S.E.2d 153 (1974);
State v. "The Bet," 219 Kan. 64, 547 P.2d 760 (1976); Parish of Jefferson v. Bayou Landing Ltd.,
350 So. 2d 158 (La. 1977); New Rivieria Arts Theatre v. State, 219 Tenn. 652, 412 S.W.2d 890
(1967)). See also supra note 83 and infra note 148.
89. 675 F.2d 1365 (4th Cir. 1982). See discussion of Fehihaber 11 supra note 36.
90. Id. at 1371.
91. Id at 1370.
92. See supra notes 54-83 and accompanying text.
93. 675 F.2d at 1368-70. The Fourth Circuit noted that the North Carolina Supreme Court
in Andrews I and!! construed Chapter 19 as requiring that the state carry the burden of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt, and as allowing nonobscenity as a defense to charges of sale of mater-
ials in defiance of a permanent injunction entered under § 19-5. Id at 1369.
94. Id at 1370. For a discussion of Vance, see supra notes 71-75 and accompanying text.
95. See 675 F.2d at 1370. The North Carolina Supreme Court apparently attached little
significance to the Fifth Circuit's claim in Vance that the Texas statute authorized restraints of
indefinite duration. See 302 N.C. at 328, 275 S.E.2d 447-48. The North Carolina Supreme Court
said the United States Supreme Court struck down the Texas statute because it failed to ensure
that nonobscenity would be a defense in all contempt proceedings. Id
96. 675 F.2d at 1370.
97. Id
98. Id
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Further, the Fehihaber II majority held that the North Carolina abate-
ment action is no more onerous than a criminal obscenity procedure because a
defendant in the initial nuisance action has the right to a jury trial and the
state has the burden of proof, just as in a criminal hearing.99 Furthermore, the
nuisance abatement statute "imposes no penal sanction upon [the defendant].
It contents itself with telling him 'you have violated the law; go and sin no
more.'-"o Thus, the defendant gets "two chances" before he is punished,
unlike a criminal defendant.101 Finally, the Fehlhaber II majority stated that
even if a broad permanent injunction chills some presumptively protected
speech, the restraint is acceptable because the state's interest in controlling
obscenity outweighs the low value of sexually-oriented materials. 102
The sole dissenter in Fehlhaber II, Judge Phillips, argued that adult
speech not yet judicially determined obscene must be included within first
amendment protection. Drawing the boundaries of protected speech more
narrowly might imperil the "core" values of political speech. 10 3 In addition,
the Court in Vance held that the presumption against the constitutionality of
injunctions prohibiting future exhibitions of protected materials is even
stronger than that applied against criminal sanctions for past communica-
tions.10 4 Traditionally, such injunctions have been allowed only when limited
to materials already determined by a court to be obscene or, alternatively,
when the injunction conforms to the Freedman standards.' 05 Judge Phillips
concluded that the North Carolina abatement statute has neither of these sav-
ing features. 106
The majority opinion in Fehlhaber 11 is appealing because it condemns
the "purveyors of hard core pornography seeking the protection of the pre-
cious values of the First Amendment" and upholds a state's right to protect
"morality and decorous communities." 10 7 Nevertheless, the North Carolina
abatement statute creates an unconstitutional prior restraint by failing to com-
ply with the three conditions of constitutionality set out by the Supreme Court
in Freedman: the censor must carry the burden of proof, pretrial restraints
must be limited, and the defendant must be ensured a prompt, final judicial
determination on the merits of the case.108
The major flaws in Chapter 19 appear in G.S. 19-4, which provides that a
defendant who violates a permanent injunction may be punished in a con-
tempt proceeding that lacks the protection of the Freedman safeguards. 0 9 For
99. id
100. Id
101. Id
102. See id at 1371.
103. Id (Phillips, J., dissenting).
104. Id at 1371-72 (Phillips, J., dissenting).
105. Id at 1372 (Phillips, J., dissenting).
106. Id (Phillips, J., dissenting).
107. Id at 1366.
108. See Freedman, 380 U.S. at 58-59. For a discussion of the Freedman test, see supra text
accompanying notes 29-30.
109. North Carolina's abatement statutes provide for two distinct kinds of hearings-the nui-
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instance, although the first prong of Freedman requires the state to bear the
burden of proving that materials are obscene, this requirement is not found on
the face of G.S. 19-4.110 That section states only the penalties available on
conviction of contempt; it fails to specify any procedural requirements for the
contempt hearing. While G.S. 19-4 appears to fail the first prong of the Freed-
man test, however, it may have been saved by the judicial gloss administered
in Andrews I, in which the North Carolina Supreme Court apparently con-
strued G.S. 19-4 to require the state to carry the burden of proof in the con-
tempt proceeding."' If the North Carolina court's construction means, as it
seems to, that the state has the burden of proof, then the statute meets the first
prong of Freedman.
The abatement statutes fail to comply with the second prong of Freed-
man, which requires that pretrial restraints be limited as much as possible.
sance trial and a contempt proceeding. Initially, a defendant charged with distributing obscenity
is entitled to a trial under the provisions of §§ 19-2.4 and 19-3, to determine if a nuisance exists. A
defendant found guilty of maintaining a nuisance by distributing obscenity may be permanently
enjoined from further activity constituting a nuisance. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 19-5 (1978). For text of
§ 19-5, see supra note 47. If the defendant is accused of violating the permanent injunction, he
may be tried for contempt of court. The contempt proceeding is governed by § 19-4 and is a
separate proceeding from the initial nuisance hearing. The contempt statute, by failing to guaran-
tee safeguards against infringement upon protected speech, appears to fall short of the Freedman
standards. See discussion at notes 110-1 1 and accompanying text.
The provisions for trial of the initial nuisance charges also fall short of the Freedman guide-
lines in one respect: the statutes fail to ensure prompt judicial decision of the question of obscen-
ity. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 19-2.2 (1978) provides that a hearing on a preliminary injunction must be
held within 10 days after application for the injunction is filed, and § 19-2.4 provides that the
hearing on the preliminary injunction and trial on the merits may be merged at the request of the
defendant. See supra note 53. Thus, although a speedy trial is assured, there is no provision
requiring the judge to make a decision shortly after trial. A prompt hearing is of little benefit to a
defendant who must wait weeks for a judicial decision on the issues.
The initial nuisance abatement procedure seems to satisfy the first prong of Freedman by
requiring the State to carry the burden of proof in the initial nuisance hearing. Although Chapter
19 does not explicitly state that the State has the burden of proof, this requirement was "read into"
the law by the North Carolina Supreme Court inAndrews L Seesupra note 57. The initial abate-
ment provisions meet the second prong of Freedman by limiting the duration of the pretrial re-
straints. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 19-2.3 (1978), for instance, provides that a defendant may move to
dissolve a temporary restraining order at any time, and the hearing on his motion must be held
within 24 hours, or on the next day that a superior court is in session in the county, whichever is
later. Hearings on preliminary injunctions must be held within 10 days after the injunction appli-
cation is filed. Id. § 19-2.2. Compare the requirements of the nuisance abatement statute with
those of the statute governing harmful material to minors, discussed infra at notes 168 & 170 and
accompanying text.
110. Section 19-4, which governs the contempt proceedings, contains almost no procedural
guidelines:
In case of the violation of any injunction granted under the provisions of this Chapter,
the court, or, in vacation, a judge thereof, may summarily try and punish the offender. A
party found guilty of contempt under the provisions of this section shall be punished by
a fine of not less than two hundred ($200.00) or more than one thousand dollars ($1,000),
or by imprisonment in the county jail not less than three or more than six months, or by
both fine and imprisonment.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 19-4 (1978).
111. "There is no significant difference procedurally in a criminal action for selling obscenity
and in a contempt action for violation of an injunction. In both proceedings the defendant can
always defend on the ground that the material is not legally obscene... The burden is on the
State to prove obscenity beyond a reasonable doubt." 296 N.C. at 264, 250 S.E.2d at 611. The
nature of the burden upon the State in the initial nuisance provision is unclear, however. See
supra note 57.
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The statutory provisions in Chapter 19 governing the initial nuisance proceed-
ing clearly comply with the Freedman standard: the statute requires a hearing
on preliminary injunctions within ten days of the filing of the motion and
allows consolidation of the preliminary injunction hearing and the trial on the
merits.'" 2 But there is no similar limitation on restraints imposed before the
contempt proceeding."13 In the initial nuisance proceeding, a defendant sub-
ject to pretrial restraints may at any time request a prompt trial on the mer-
its. 114 If the defendant is found guilty at the initial proceeding of distributing
obscenity, he may be subjected to a permanent injunction barring further dis-
tribution of any other "such" material.115 Any further proceedings against the
defendant, then, will be cast in the form of a contempt proceeding for viola-
tion of the permanent injunction. Yet G.S. 19-4 contains no provision for re-
stricting the duration of the restraints imposed before the contempt hearing.
Not only will the permanent injunction continue to bind the defendant, but
G.S. 19-4 contains no provision limiting imposition of any new restrictions.
The statute violates the third Freedman requirement because it fails to
guarantee prompt, final judicial determination of the obscenity issue. G.S. 19-
4 contains no time limit for a judicial decision on the question of obscenity
following the contempt trial. Even if the trial were held promptly, there is no
guarantee that a decision would be rendered without delay.
The third prong of Freedman is violated in another way. The very nature
of a contempt proceeding, coupled with the impossibility of clearly defining
obscenity, creates a serious risk that the obscenity issue will never reach a
court. A defendant faced with a broad permanent injunction forbidding sales
of both materials determined obscene at trial and other "such items" must
determine what items on his shelves are likely to be determined obscene in a
contempt proceeding. If the defendant guesses wrong and sells an item later
determined obscene, he faces a fine or jail sentence for contempt. Thus, the
safest course for the businessman is to remove all adult materials from his
shelves, including those that might be nonobscene. Therefore, while judicial
review remains available in theory, as a practical matter the issue of obscenity
of the "similar" items may never reach court at all, violating the Freedman
requirement of guaranteed judicial review on the issue of obscenity." 16
Although the United States Supreme Court has never ruled on the ques-
tion, it seems likely that the cautious rule adopted in Freedman never was
112. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 19-2.2, -2A (1978).
113. See id § 19-4.
114. Id § 19-2A.
115. Id § 19-5.
116. In Freedman the United States Supreme Court recognized the danger that many disputes
involving prior restraints would simply never reach a court. "Without these safeguards [the three-
pronged test], it may prove too burdensome to seek review of the censor's determination. Particu-
larly in the case of motion pictures, it may take very little to deter exhibition in a given locality.
The exhibitor's stake in any one picture may be insufficient to warrant a protracted and onerous
course of litigation." 380 U.S. 51, 59 (1964). For a discussion of the Freedman test, see supra text
accompanying notes 29-30.
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intended to authorize broad permanent injunctions. 17 The Freedman Court
agreed to allow prior restraints against spec4Ycally named materials only if cer-
tain safeguards were provided. When the Freedman safeguards are followed,
there is no uncertainty about the materials that are subject to restraint, and the
restrictions are limited in scope and duration. A broad permanent injunction,
on the other hand, creates a much greater burden on speech. First, it will
usually be impossible for a defendant to identify all materials subject to the
injunction. In addition, a permanent injunction by its very nature is not lim-
ited in duration. Freedman permits prior restraints on speech in very limited
circumstances and should not be read to allow broad permanent injunctions,
which impose the very kinds of far-reaching restrictions on speech that the
Freedman safeguards were designed to prevent.
In addition to failing the Freedman test, the North Carolina abatement
statutes present other constitutional difficulties. One test of constitutionality
provides that restrictions on speech are constitutional so long as the resulting
"chill" is no greater than that created by a criminal obscenity statute.' 8 Ini-
tially, it should be noted that it is not clear whether the "abatement vs. crimi-
nal burdens" test is the proper standard for judging all abatement statutes.' 19
Assuming, however, that the test is proper, comparison of North Carolina's
Chapter 19 and criminal obscenity law120 reveals that the abatement statutes
create a greater restraint on speech.
The Fehlhaber II majority based its decision on its finding that the abate-
ment statute is less burdensome than the criminal laws. That court pointed
out that North Carolina's abatement statute, as interpreted by the North Caro-
lina Supreme Court, requires the state to carry the burden of proof,12 1 gives
the defendant the right to a jury trial, 122 and provides that nonobscenity is a
defense to a contempt proceeding.' 23 An additional argument not relied on by
the Fehlhaber II majority is that permanent injunctions issued under Chapter
19 create no greater uncertainty than is created by the state's criminal statute,
since the statutes define obscenity in similar ways. 124 The Fourth Circuit in
117. 296 N.C. at 272-73, 250 S.E.2d at 616 (Exum, J., dissenting).
118. See, e.g., Vance, 445 U.S. at 315-16; Fehlhaber I1, 675 F.2d at 1370;Andrews II, 302 N.C.
at 328, 275 S.E.2d at 448.
119. The test seems to have originated in Kingsley Books v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436 (1957), dis-
cussed supra note 60. While the test appears to have been used in Vance, 445 U.S. at 315-16, there
is no indication in the brief Vance opinion that the Court intended that the abatement versus
criminal burdens test be used in future cases. See Note, supra note 5, at 160. Furthermore, the
Court did not identify factors a court may consider in determining whether an abatement statute
chills speech more than does a criminal obscenity law. Id at 161. Moreover, the Vance opinion
did not clearly indicate the role the Freedman test would play in cases using the Kingsley burdens
test. Despite these problems with the Vance opinion and the burdens test, the author of the Note,
Control of Obscenity, suggests the test is at least an acceptable approach to the problem of prior
restraints created by nuisance abatement statutes. Id
120. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-190.2 (1981). See discussion of the criminal obscenity law in.4n-
drews I, 296 N.C. at 279-80, 250 S.E.2d at 615 (Exum, J., dissenting).
121. See supra note 57, and accompanying text.
122. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 19-2.4 (1978). See discussion of the abatement statutes, supra note 53.
123. See 675 F.2d at 370.
124. Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. § 19-1.1(2) (1978) with id § 14-190.1(b), -190.1(c) (1981). See
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Fehlhaber I also noted that although there is no right to a jury trial in a
contempt action under North Carolina's abatement statute, a jury is not re-
quired in a criminal contempt proceeding either. 125
Despite these observations, however, the Fehlhaber 11 characterization of
the abatement and criminal obscenity statutes is not entirely accurate. A de-
fendant clearly has been given the right to have a jury determine the merits of
his case if an injunction is issued against specific items found obscene at the
initial nuisance trial.' 26 But when a broadly-worded permanent injunction is
issued, no jury has determined the issue of obscenity of the similar items en-
joined by the order. 127 The issue of obscenity of the unnamed items will be
decided for the first time in the later contempt proceeding when the defendant
is prosecuted for selling materials in violation of the injunction. The North
Carolina abatement statute does not provide for a jury trial in these contempt
proceedings.' 28 Contrary to the position of the majority in Fehlhaber11, how-
ever, the civil contempt proceeding should not be compared to a criminal con-
tempt action, in which a jury trial is similarly denied. As one commentator
has noted, "The parallel proceeding under a criminal obscenity law is not a
criminal contempt proceeding, but, rather, an initial criminal trial on the mer-
its.'1 29 In both the nuisance contempt action for violation of a broad injunc-
tion and a criminal trial on the merits, the issue of obscenity is being
determined for the first time. Yet the criminal defendant is guaranteed the
right to a jury trial, and the civil defendant is not.130
Further, the North Carolina criminal statutes are less burdensome than
the abatement statutes because the criminal laws require a separate judicial
finding of obscenity before presumptively protected materials may be seized or
used as the basis of a criminal prosecution.' 31 When a defendant is charged
with violating a broadly-worded injunction, however, the abatement statutes
guarantee no such determination before the material is seized.'
32
The abatement statute is more burdensome than the criminal obscenity
laws in other ways. For instance, a criminal defendant must be shown to have
scienter or intent to distribute or possess obscenity. 133 Intent is not required
296 N.C. at 261,250 S.E.2d at 609 (comparing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 19-1.1(2)(1978) with criteria of
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973)). But see infra notes 136-41.
125. 675 F.2d at 1369. See Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373 (1966).
126. In other words, a defendant could have requested a jury trial in the initial nuisance pro-
ceeding. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 19-2.4 (1978). When the injunction bars only the material specifically
found obscene at trial, every item has thus been considered by a jury.
127. For a more detailed discussion, see Note, supra note 5, at 163.
128. Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. § 19-2.4 (1978) (allowing a jury trial during the initial nui-
sance action) with id. § 19-4 (allowing no jury for contempt hearings).
129. Note, supra note 5, at 163.
130. Id at 164.
131. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-190.2 (1981). On the validity of seizures of materials presump-
tively protected under the first amendment, see Edelstein & Mott, supra note 32.
132. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 19-4 (1978).
133. Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-190.1(a), -190.1(e) (1981).
See generally Comment, Proof of Scienter in Criminal Obscenity Prosecutions, 9 AKRON L. REV.
131 (1975).
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under the Chapter 19 provisions. 134 Further, North Carolina's criminal ob-
scenity provisions define obscenity more precisely than do the abatement stat-
utes, giving criminal defendants more notice than is received by defendants in
abatement cases. 135 The definition of obscenity in G.S. 19-1.1,136 the abate-
ment statute, may be more vague than the standard used in North Carolina's
criminal statute,1 37 which is the constitutional minimum set forth by the
Supreme Court in Miller v. California.138 The abatement statute defines ob-
scenity in terms of "the context in which it is used,"139 language that appears
neither in Miller nor in the criminal statute. This alteration makes the abate-
ment standard more subjective than Miller's, rendering items nonobscene
134. Andrews 11, 302 N.C. at 331, 275 S.E.2d at 449 (Exum, J., dissenting).
135. Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-190.1(b), -190.1(c) (1981) with id § 19-1.1(2) (1978).
136. North Carolina's abatement statute defines obscenity as any matter.
(a) Which the average person, applying contemporary community standards would
find, when considered as a whole, appeals to the prurient interests; and
(b) Which depicts patently offensive representations of:
I. ultimate sexual acts, normal or perverted, actual or simulated;
2. masturbation, excretory functions, or lewd exhibition of the genitals or genital
area;
3. masochism or sadism; or
4. sexual acts with a child or animal.
Nothing herein contained is intended to include or proscribe any writing or written ma-
terial, nor to include or proscribe any matter, which, when considered as a whole, and in
the context for which it is used, possesses serious literary, artistic, political, educational
or scientific value.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 19-l.l(2)(a)-(b) (1978).
137. North Carolina's criminal obscenity statute tracks the language of Miller v. California,
413 U.S. 15 (1973), and provides in relevant part:
(b) For purposes of this Article any material is obscene if.
(1) The material depicts or describes in a patently offensive way sexual conduct
specifically defined by subsection (c) of this section; and
(2) The average person applying contemporary statewide community standards re-
lating to the depiction or representation of sexual matters would find that the
material taken as a whole appeals to the prurient interest in sex; and
(3) The material lacks serious literary, artistic, political, educational or scientific
value; and
(4) The material as used is not protected or privileged under the Constitution of
the United States or the Constitution of North Carolina.
(c) Sexual conduct shall be defined as:
(1) Patently offensive representations or descriptions of actual sexual intercourse,
normal or perverted, anal or oral;
(2) Patently offensive representations or descriptions of excretion in the context of
sexual activity or a lewd exhibition of uncovered genitals, in the context of mastur-
bation or other sexual activity.
N.C. GEN. STAT. 14-190.1 (1981). Compare the wording of the criminal obscenity statute above
with North Carolina's "adult" zoning ordinance, infra note 141.
138. 413 U.S. 15 (1973). The Miller standard defines obscenity in terms of:
(a) whether the 'average person, applying contemporary community standards' would
find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest...
(b) whether the work depicts or describes in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct
specifically defined by the applicable state law, and
(c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political or scien-
tific value.
ld. at 24.
139. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 19-1.1(2) (1978).
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under Miller abateable under Chapter 19.140 If the abatement standard is in
fact broader than Miller's, it is probably unconstitutional; at best the standard
is vaguer than Miller, creating a greater burden on nuisance abatement
defendants.141
The Fehlhaber II majority also asserted that sexually-oriented material is
less valuable than other kinds of speech and therefore deserves less first
amendment protection.' 42 The court concluded that any chill created by the
nuisance abatement statute is outweighed by the state's interest in controlling
obscenity.143 The idea of affording different levels of protection to speech is
not new. Support for this "tier" approach to the first amendment, however,
appears unstable among members of the Supreme Court. 44
140. For example, it might be possible to construe the abatement statute to impose liability on
the seller of a copy of GRAY's ANATOMY, a standard medical reference text, if the book is used to
create sexual arousal. Hogue, supra note 42, at 40 n.197. Under the Miller standard, on the other
hand, "material retains its scientific value apart from any other use or misuse to which it may be
put." Id The abatement statute's definition of obscenity is constitutionally defective to the extent
it leaves unprotected material that would be nonobscene, and thus protected, by the first amend-
ment under the Miller standard. Id at 13 n.56. For a discussion of other possible drafting flaws
in the abatement statute, see Watts, supra note 36, at 215-20.
141. The abatement procedure appears even more burdensome when compared to the speci-
ficity with which prohibited matter is defined in North Carolina's criminal statute, which allows
zoning to regulate adult establishments. The statute provides that only one adult business may be
located in one building. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-202.11 (1981). Violation of the rule is a misde-
meanor. Id § 14-202.12. Adult establishments include adult bookstores, defined as bookstores
with a preponderance of materials "characterized by their emphasis on matter depicting, describ-
ing, or relating to specified sexual activities or specified anatomical areas." Id § 14-202.10(1).
Specified anatomical areas are defined as:
(a) less than completely and opaquely covered: (i) human genitals, pubic region,
(ii) buttock or (iii) female breast below a point immediately above the top of the
areola; or
(b) human male genitals in a discernibly turgid state, even if completely and opaquely
covered.
Id § 14-202.10(8). Specified sexual activities are defined as:
(a) human genitals in a state of sexual stimulation or arousal;
(b) acts of human masturbation, sexual intercourse or sodomy; or
(c) fondling or other erotic touchings of human genitals, pubic regions, buttocks, or
female breasts.
Id § 14-202.10(9).
142. 675 F.2d at 1371.
143. See id
144. Several Supreme Court justices have advocated lowering the level of first amendment
protection given to certain kinds of speech. In Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50
(1976), Justice Stevens argued for a plurality that the state's interest in protecting erotic materials
is less than its interest in ensuring free political debate:
Whether political oratory or philosophical discussion moves us to applaud or to despise
what is said, every schoolchild can understand why our duty to defend the right to speak
remains the same. But few of us would march our sons and daughters off to war to
preserve the citizen's right to see "Specified Sexual Activities" exhibited in the theatres of
our choice.
Id at 70.
Five members of the Court apparently subscribed to the theory that indecent (not obscene)
speech holds a lower place in the scale of first amendment protection in FCC v. Pacifica Founda-
tion, 438 U.S. 726 (1978). Interestingly, in Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Servs.
Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 562-63 (1980), Justice Powell applied a similar multitiered approach to
commercial speech. Yet Powell dissented in Pacdca and American Mini Theatres. The Court,
however, has not applied the multitiered theory in all obscenity-related cases. See Paris Adult
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A related notion, also relied upon by the Fehlhaber H majority, is that
pictorial matter, the only kind of "speech" affected by North Carolina's abate-
ment statute, constitutes a kind of "second class" speech. 14 5 This conclusion is
inconsistent with the United States Supreme Court decision in Joseph Burstyn,
Inc. v. Wilson,146 which extended first amendment protection to visual
material, and subsequent Supreme Court decisions that have continued to pro-
tect pictorial matter.14 7 A rule affording less protection to visual communica-
tion flies in the face of settled Supreme Court holdings and creates definitional
problems in an area already mired in confusion. For instance, the Fehlhaber
II majority' ignored the problem of rating the "value" of materials that con-
tain both pictures and words as well as that of identifying the standard by
which such materials should be measured to determine the level of protection
they "deserve." 148
In approving North Carolina's abatement statute, the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals ignored a clear trend against allowing permanent injunc-
tions to issue against materials never judicially determined obscene. Courts in
twelve states and two federal circuits have struck down injunctions similar to
the one upheld in Fehlhaber Z1.'14 9
Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973) (films) and Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (illus-
trated books). See also Hogue, supra note 42, at 39.
145. "Explicit photographic portrayals of natural and deviant sexual activity stand upon a
plain far below. . . ." 675 F.2d at 371. At least one commentator has noted that courts seem to
allow greater infringement on modern electronic media rights, such as television and radio, than
on more traditional forms of communication, such as books. L. TRIBE, supra note 15, at 700. The
explanation may be an historical judicial preference for print media, combined with the need for
special regulation of electronic media:
Broadcast regulation has proceeded upon the premise that, since government must some-
how carve up the electromagnetic spectrum so as to prevent interference among broad-
cast frequencies, those who are permitted to use the public airwaves may be selected on
criteria and subject to controls that would be unacceptable in the case of the print media.
Id at 698. Compare this view that the form of the media determines the level of protection to the
idea expressed supra note 144, that perceived social value may determine the level of protection.
146. 343 U.S. 495 (1952). "It cannot be doubted that motion pictures are a significant medium
for the communication of ideas. . . . The importance of motion pictures as an organ of public
opinion is not lessened by the fact they are designed to entertain as well as to inform." Id at 501.
147. "Neither logic nor case law compels the conclusion that the first amendment does not
apply or applies with less vigor to graphics rather than written material." Hogue, supra note 42, at
39. Recent Supreme Court cases extending protection to pictorial matter include Freedman v.
Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1964) (movies); Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717 (1961)
(magazines).
148. There are numerous variations on this problem. A book may have many pictures and no
written material other than captions, or it may have thousands of pages of text and one obscene
picture.
149. Decisions in the supreme courts of California, Georgia, Alabama, Kansas, Tennessee,
Louisiana, and Florida were cited by the federal district court in Fehlhaber I. See supra note 83.
Cases striking down broad injunctions as creating impermissible prior restraints include Spokane
Arcades, Inc. v. Brockett, 631 F.2d 135 (9th Cir. 1980) (Washington); Universal Amusement Co. v.
Vance, 587 F.2d 159, 167-69 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc) (Texas), a f'd, 445 U.S. 308 (1980) (per
curiam); Bayside Enterprises, Inc. v. Carson, 470 F. Supp. 1140 (M.D. Fla. 1979); Gulf State
Theatres of La., Inc. v. Richardson, 287 So. 2d 480 (La. 1973); State ex rel Cahalan v. Diversified
Theatrical Corp., 59 Mich. App. 223, 229 N.W.2d 389 (1975), rev'd on other grounds, 396 Mich.
244, 240 N.W.2d 460 (1976); State ex ret Wampler v. Bird, 499 S.W.2d 780 (Mo. 1973); State ex
rel Leis v. Barton, 45 Ohio App. 2d 249, 344 N.E.2d 343 (1975); State ex rel. Ewing v. A Motion
Picture Entitled "Without A Stitch," 37 Ohio St. 2d 95, 207 N.E.2d 911 (1974), appeal dismissed
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For example, in New Rivieria Arts Theatre v. State-1 0 the Tennessee
Supreme Court held that permanent injunctions may issue only against specif-
ically named films. A Tennessee statute provided that when a person was
found to be distributing obscene material, the State could institute an action to
"'prevent such sales, distribution, exhibition or display or further sales, distri-
bution, exhibition or display or the further acquisition of any such mate-
rial."151 Defendant in New Rivieria was found guilty of displaying an
obscene film and several obscene previews or "trailers." 1 2 The trial judge
permanently enjoined defendant from showing the particular film found to be
obscene and "[o]ther films. . . or 'trailers' of the sort, kind or type which may
be classified by the court as 'obscene material' under the definition of [the
Tennessee statute]."' 53 The Tennessee appellate court interpreted the statute
to permit permanent injunctions to issue only against material judicially deter-
mined obscene. 154 A construction of the statute authorizing injunctions
against display of unidentified films "would vest in the courts an unlimited
power of prior restraint on the freedom of speech and press."155
The provisions of the Tennessee statute in New Rivieria and North Caro-
lina's abatement statute appear very similar, but have been given very differ-
ent interpretations by the courts. Arguably, both statutes on their faces permit
injunctions against material never judicially declared obscene. 156 Tennessee,
however, chose to salvage its statute by a judicial construction that limits per-
manent injunctions to material specifically found by a court to be obscene.
The North Carolina Supreme Court and the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals,
on the other hand, chose a more literal interpretation of the North Carolina
statute, and permitted broad, permanent injunctions. The North Carolina
courts could have placed a limiting construction on the abatement statutes, but
if a literal interpretation of the language were deemed essential, the courts
should have declared the provision unconstitutional.
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit and the North Carolina
courts may have been willing to overlook the constitutional difficulties in
Chapter 19 because they feared limitation on the scope of the statutes would
sub nom Art Theatre Guild v. Ewing, 421 U.S. 923 (1975); State ex rel Field v. Hess, 540 P.2d
1165 (Okla. 1975); Brightbill v. Rigo, 274 Pa. 315, 418 A.2d 424 (1980).
150. 219 Tenn. 652, 412 S.W.2d 890 (1967).
151. Id at 658, 412 S.W.2d at 893 (quoting Act of Mar. 3, 1965, ch. 93, § 1(a), 1965 Tenn. Pub,
Acts 327, 327 (repealed 1974) (formerly codified at TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-3005(a))). For the full
text of the statute, see infra note 156.
152. 219 Tenn. at 656, 412 S.W.2d at 892.
153. Id at 657, 412 S.W.2d at 892.
154. Id at 659, 412 S.W.2d at 894.
155. Id at 663, 412 S.W.2d at 895.
156. The Tennessee statute, since repealed, provided in relevant part:
(a) The District Attorney General, in any district where a person, firm or corporation
sells, distributes, exhibits or displays, or is about to sell, distribute, exhibit or display...
any material which is obscene as hereinafter defined, may maintain an action for an
injunction. . . to prevent such sales, distribution, exhibition or display or further sales,
distribution, exhibition or display, or the further acquisition of any such materials.
219 Tenn. at 658, 412 S.W.2d at 893 (quoting Act of Mar. 3, 1965, ch. 93, § 1(a), 1965 Tenn. Pub.
Acts 327, 327 (repealed 1974) (formerly codified at TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-3005(a))).
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dilute a powerful weapon in the state's arsenal against obscenity. 57 But the
state would not be stripped of power to regulate obscenity by abatement ac-
tions even if permanent injunctions could issue only against materials judi-
cially declared obscene. With proper planning, large numbers of allegedly
obscene items could be considered in a single trial. Copies of alleged obscen-
ity may be seized as evidence prior to trial under a warrant issued by a neutral
magistrate who has independently determined that probable cause exists to
believe the items are obscene. 158 Once in evidence, the merits of all the sam-
ples may be adjudicated in a single hearing by the trial judge, eliminating the
need for a separate trial for each item.
In addition to nuisance abatement proceedings, the state has other meth-
ods of regulating sexually-oriented speech. Some of the alternatives include
restricting adult businesses to certain areas through zoning laws,' 5 9 requiring
dealers to obtain licenses, 160 pursuing criminal prosecutions for violation of
157. Justice Exum, dissenting in Andrews I, spoke to this concern when he argued that his
proposed construction of the abatement statute "does not render the state powerless to deal with
the problem of obscenity." 296 N.C. 251, 280, 250 S.E.2d 603, 620 (1979).
Justice Dupree, who wrote the opinion in Fehlhaber I, discussed supra notes 84-88 and ac-
companying text, voiced similar concerns. "The court is also aware that the regulation of such
materials [obscenity] would perhaps be more easily accomplished through the broad injunctive
relief authorized by section 19-5 than through any other means." 445 F. Supp. at 140.
158. Heller v. New York, 413 U.S. 483 (1973). Of course, seizures of items for preservation of
evidence must not be so massive that they amount to a prior restraint. For a discussion of seizures
of first amendment materials, see supra note 33.
159. The leading case in the area of zoning and first amendment activities is Young v. Ameri-
can Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976). In Young, the United States Supreme Court upheld a
Detroit zoning ordinance that provided no adult theatre could be established within 1,000 feet of
any other business defined by the law as a "regulated use." The Court held that society's interest
in preserving the character and property value of neighborhoods outweighed the marginal value
of sexually-oriented speech disseminated by adult theatres. The Court emphasized the Detroit
zoning ordinance was not designed to censor the content of speech, but rather to preserve property
values; the purpose of the ordinance was demonstrated by a study completed by the City of De-
troit prior to adoption of the zoning ordinance. The Court also pointed out that the ordinance did
not limit consumer access to sexually-oriented speech in the overall market. Id at 62. For a
discussion of the licensing aspects of American Mini Theatres, see supra note 34 and infra note 160.
Since American Mini Theatres, zoning regulations have become an increasingly popular
means of controlling adult businesses, but courts have disagreed about the validity of such laws.
Annot., 1 A.L.R. 4th 1297, 1298 (1980). North Carolina's adult business zoning law prohibits
location of more than one adult business in a single building. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-202.10 to .12
(1981). See supra note 141. The North Carolina Supreme Court has not ruled on the constitution-
ality of the statute. A city ordinance similar to the state provision was discussed by the state court
of appeals, however, in Harts Book Stores, Inc. v. City of Raleigh, 53 N.C. App. 753, 281 S.E.2d
761 (1981). The court refused to discuss whether the ordinance was constitutional, however, and
decided the case on other grounds.
See also Wigginess Inc. v. Fruchtman, 482 F. Supp. 681 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (upholding a New
York City zoning law for massage parlors); City of Minot v. Central Ave. News, Inc., 308 N.W.2d
851 (N.D. 1981) (upholding city zoning ordinance similar to the one discussed inAmerican Mini
Theatres).
But see The Purple Onion, Inc. v. Jackson, 511 F. Supp. 1207 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (zoning ordi-
nance invalidated because plan left no alternative locations for adult businesses inside city limits);
E & B Enter. v. City of University Park, 449 F. Supp. 695 (N.D. Tex. 1977) (invalidating an
ordinance as a prior restraint when the zoning law left no alternative sites for the adult business
and the city presented no reasons for regulating sexually-oriented businesses). For a general dis-
cussion of zoning and the first amendment, see Developments in the Law-Zoning, 91 HARv. L.
REV. 1427, 1562-63 & n.81 (1978); Annot., 1 A.L.R. 4th 1297 (1980).
160. Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976), upheld a licensing provision as a
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obscenity laws, 161 enforcing statutes through qui tam actions,162 and imposing
reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions on sexually-oriented
speech.163 Local governments also have statutory power to enact their own,
albeit limited, regulations on obscenity, 164 and state and local governments
also may retain their common-law powers to control obscenity.'16 5
North Carolina's civil remedy for sale of harmful materials to minors is a
mechanism to enforce a city zoning provision when the combined effect of the zoning and licens-
ing ordinances did not substantially restrict access to "adult speech" and when the ordinances
promoted a substantial city interest in preserving neighborhood property values. See also Annot.,
8 A.L.R. 4th 130 (1980). But see supra note 34 (examples of licensing systems that have been
invalidated as creating illegal prior restraints on presumptively protected speech).
161. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-190.1 to .11 (1981) are North Carolina's chief criminal obscene
literature statutes. See supra note 137. The provisions of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-202.10 to .12
(1981) limit the number of adult establishments that may be located in a single building and
provide criminal penalties for violators. See supra note 141.
162. A qui tam action is a suit brought under a statute that establishes a civil penalty for
omission or commission of some act. To encourage enforcement of the act, the individual who
brings the suit receives part of the penalty the defendant pays. The remainder of the penalty goes
to the state. Bass Angler Sportsman Soc'y v. United States Steel Corp., 324 F. Supp. 412, 415
(N.D. Ala. 1971). A quitam action may not be brought, however, unless there is a specific statute
authorizing the action; apparently no state has passed legislation allowing qui tam actions to en-
force obscenity rules. See Williams v. Wells Fargo & Co. Express, 177 F. 352 (8th Cir. 1910)
(postal laws); Lanni v. City of Bayonne, 7 N.J. Super. 169, 72 A.2d 397 (1950) (zoning laws);
Salonen v. Farley, 82 F. Supp. 25 (E.D. Ky. 1949) (gambling laws). See also Note, supra note 5, at
139.
163. Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 575-76 (1941). See also L. TRIE, supra note 15, at
662.
164. Hogue, supra note 42, at 35. The North Carolina General Assembly has delegated the
authority to define and abate nuisances to cities and counties. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153A-121 (1978)
(counties); id § 160A-174. The North Carolina Supreme Court interpreted the power delegated
to cities and counties to allow local governments to set a higher standard of behavior than the
State statute requires, but not to pass ordinances that merely duplicate existing state statutes.
State v. Tenore, 280 N.C. 238, 247, 185 S.E.2d 644, 650 (1972).
The power of local governments to regulate obscene behavior more strictly than does state
law does not permit cities and counties to redefine obscenity. The Supreme Court set a constitu-
tional minimum standard of obscenity in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973), and statutes
using a broader definition are presumably unconstitutional. See Hogue, supra note 42, at 40. The
power of local governments extends simply to setting fines and punishments not provided by the
state statute. Local governments may treat obscenity "as a nuisance subject to abatement or de-
fine it as a misdemeanor and provide for a fine or imprisonment upon conviction or for a civil
penalty." Hogue, supra note 42, at 36-37.
Local communities also exercise "control" over obscenity in the sense that the Miller stan-
dard defines obscenity in terms of what local communities deem patently offensive. Thus, a film
that is not "obscene" in Los Angeles might be banned in a small North Carolina town as patently
offensive to local tastes.
165. Hogue, supra note 42, at 37. At common law, obscenity was actionable both civilly and
criminally. Id at 3. Early North Carolina cases show officials relied almost exclusively on crimi-
nal actions to control obscenity. Further, there is no common-law authority for a private citizen to
abate a public nuisance in North Carolina. Id at 34. "Absent special legislative provision by
statute authorizing private persons to sue for public nuisance, individuals may not redress public
nuisances unless their own property is interfered with." Id But "[b]ecause obscenity is a common
law crime, both abatement by public officers and indictment would be available remedies unless
these are restricted or foreclosed by the provision of exclusive state remedies, or . . .unless the
common law of obscenity has been ... repealed by state law." Id at 35. Arguably, then, the
common-law power to control obscenity still exists. 1d at 37.
Attempts to use common-law powers to abate obscenity in a civil action in other states have
met with little success, however. Many courts have held the common-law nuisance concept too
vggue to be applied to materials presumptively protected by the first amendment. See Grove
Press v. City of Philadelphia, 418 F.2d 82 (3d Cir. 1969), City of Chicago v. Festival Theatre
Corp., 88 Ill. App. 3d 216, 410 N.E.2d 341 (1980); Ranck v. Bonal Enters., 467 Pa. 569, 359 A.2d
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final method of obscenity control available to courts and government bod-
ies. 166 Although the Act apparently has been used little in the past, it may
gain increasing importance in light of a recent United States Supreme Court
decision granting states expanded power to regulate dissemination of lewd
material to minors. 167 North Carolina's Act provides a speedy procedure for
determining whether speech is harmful to those under eighteen and allows
regulation of such speech, even though the materials might not be obscene for
adults. Permanent injunctions may issue barring distribution of the harmful
materials or other "such" items.' 68 Although it is well-established that courts
may use a lower standard in regulating access of minors to sexually-oriented
speech, 169 the North Carolina statute suffers from several of the flaws that
plague the nuisance abatement regulations.' 70 Because there are no reported
cases concerning the Act, it is not yet clear whether the statute may be judi-
cially interpreted to conform to the Freedman guidelines and other constitu-
tional requirements.
While the state has ample means to control obscenity, a better solution
748 (1976); Commonwealth v. MacDonald, 464 Pa. 435, 347 A.2d 290 (1975), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 816 (1976).
166. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 19-9 to -20 (1978).
167. In New York v. Ferber, 102 S. Ct. 3348 (1982), the United States Supreme Court upheld
a New York statute barring knowing dissemination of material depicting sexual performances by
children under sixteen, regardless of whether the material is obscene. The Court held that a differ-
ent standard may be used by states in regulating "child pornography" than the standard required
under the Miller v. Caifornia obscenity test, set out supra note 16. For child pornography cases,
the Ferber Court eliminated the Miller requirements that material be found to appeal to the pruri-
ent interest of the average person, be portrayed in a patently offensive manner and be considered
as a whole before it may be banned. 102 S. Ct. at 3358.
The state's freedom to ban nonobscene material depicting sexual acts by minors rests on its
strong interest in protecting the physical and emotional well-being of its children, the Ferber
Court held. Id. at 3354. Further, said the Court, the first amendment value of child pornography
is "exceedingly modest, if not de minimis." Id at 3357.
The Supreme Court's decision in Ferber gives states broader power to regulate material de-
picting sexual acts by minors. The decision may encourage more vigorous enforcement of statutes
like North Carolina's restrictions on child pornography. See infra note 170. For additional dis-
cussion of Ferber, see 68 A.B.A. J. 1153 (1982).
168. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 19-14 (1978) provides that the complaint "shall: . . . (5) seek a per-
manent injunction against any respondent prohibiting him from selling, commercially distribut-
ing, or disseminating in any manner such material to minors or from permitting minors to inspect
such material." Id (emphasis added).
169. New York v. Ferber, 102 S. Ct. 3348 (1982) (discussed supra note 167). Ginsberg v. New
York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968) (dictum), Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964) (dictum).
170. See supra notes 109-17 and accompanying text (discussing North Carolina's nuisance
abatement statute).
The "harmful materials" statute seems to permit illegal prior restraints on dissemination of
presumptively protected material by authorizing broadly-worded permanent injunctions against
items which have never been judicially determined harmful to minors. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 19-
18(b) (1978). The statute provides that after a court finds material harmful to minors, it may enter
a permanent injunction against future distribution of any "such material" by the defendant. Pre-
sumably "such material" means items similar to those actually found harmful by the court. The
injunction is thus not limited to exact material specifically ruled on by the court.
Further, the statute fails the first prong of the Freedman test because it does not specify that
the state has the burden of proving the material harmful to minors. The statute meets the second
prong of Freedman by limiting the scope and duration of pretrial restrictions on presumptively
protected material. Id. § 19-19. The third prong of Freedman, which requires prompt judicial
review and decision on the merits, is provided for in Id. § 19-17.
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would be to extend first amendment protection to all sexually-oriented speech.
This outcome is mandated by the clear language of the first amendment, 171
and would eliminate confusion about the proper method of defining and de-
tecting obscenity. 172 The tangle of conflicting decisions in the obscenity area
strongly suggests that courts are not equipped to make uniform judgments
about obscenity, a term whose definition is subject to constantly changing soci-
etal standards. 173 Recognition of all forms of communication as speech that
deserves first amextdment protection would remove the courts from their role
as censors of the public mind, leaving dockets clear for cases within the realm
of judicial competence.
Even if courts could agree on a workable standard of obscenity that
would be acceptable to a majority of the public, there would remain a dissent-
ing minority, whose access to ideas and information would be suppressed by
the majority. Yet the first amendment was specifically designed to protect un-
popular ideas and preserve robust public debate. 174 Clearly, messages ac-
cepted by the majority do not need the championship of the courts. But ideas
viewed as repulsive or alien must be protected or they will be trampled. And
without the voice of dissent, society will lose a source of growth and
creativity.175
It seems unlikely that first amendment protection will soon be extended to
obscene material, although some observers note growing support for such a
move.176 At the very least, however, North Carolina's nuisance abatement
statutes should be changed to conform to the minimum constitutional stan-
dard. First, and most importantly, G.S. 19-5 should be amended to permit
permanent injunctions only against material actually determined obscene in
an adversarial judicial hearing. 177 Restricting the statute in this way would
prevent creation of illegal prior restraints on presumptively protected material
and would conform to the overwhelming trend of court decisions in other
171. See supra note 12.
172. This approach was suggested in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 37 (1973) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting), and m Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 73 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Both are cited in Andrews I, 296 N.C. at 277 n.3, 250 S.E.2d at 618 n.3 (Exum, J., dissenting).
173. The list of great writers who have been banned as objectionable at one time or another,
according to the tastes of the moment, constitutes a literary "Who's Who." "The list is endless. It
includes the works of Dante, Boccaccio, Erasmus, Michelangelo, Cervantes, Galileo, Shakespeare,
Sir Francis Bacon, Descartes, Milton, LaFontaine, Moliere, Locke, Swift, Swedenborg, Voltaire,
Fielding, Rousseau, Kant, Jefferson..." Hart, Introduction, in CENSORSHIP: FOR & AGAINST 6
(H. HART ed. 1971).
174. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
175. Extension of first amendment protection to these unpopular ideas would not deprive the
states of the power to regulate obscenity. States would remain free to place reasonable time, place,
and manner restrictions in order to protect children and unwilling adults. L. TRIBE, upra note 15,
at 661-62.
176. See Rendleman, supra note 38. Rendleman recognizes that complete first amendment
protection for all forms of sexually-oriented speech is not soon likely. As a "way station in the
process of cultural transformation," he suggests that states abandon "criminal penalties in favor of
an exclusive civil remedy providing for injunctive relief' against pornography. Id at 510.
177. The court should also eliminate the closure or padlocking provisions that appear to be
contained in Chapter 19. This change would eliminate the current uncertainty over the closure
provisions and prevent retraints on future speech based on past violations of obscenity laws by a
business. See discussion of padlocking, supra note 36.
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states. Limiting restrictions to speech determined obscene would also parallel
the requirements of North Carolina's criminal obscenity statutes.
Second, the currently vague definition of obscenity under the abatement
statute should be amended to reflect the Miller standard, avoiding the possibil-
ity that the nuisance act permits abatement of items not obscene under Miller.
It may be a long time before the state legislature is willing to accept such
a "compromise" and revise North Carolina's abatement statute to conform to
constitutional standards. It will be longer still before courts are willing to ex-
tend first amendment protection to obscenity. The framers of the first amend-
ment understood the human desire to silence unpopular views because they
had suffered the tyranny of censorship. The courts of today must re-learn the
lesson of the first amendment: the courts cannot stop obscenity. Sellers of
pornography will exist as long as there is a demand for their message. Al-
though censorship cannot destroy ideas, it can destroy the freedom to form
them.
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